Abstract. This paper summarises our position on the use of symbolic methods for reasoning under uncertainty, and argumentation in particular. Our view is that argumentation o ers a complement to numerical methods for reasoning about belief, and a general framework within which many competing approaches can be understood. In applications we have found that argumentation o ers a variety of bene ts for practical reasoning systems. The presentation is historical, emphasising the reasons which motivated the development of the argumentation framework, drawing primarily on work carried out by researchers at the Imperial Cancer Research Fund over the last fteen years.
The need for symbolic decision making
Work on argumentation at the Imperial Cancer Research Fund arose out of a series of studies on medical decision making, including work on modelling human diagnostic reasoning 12] and comparisons of the relative merits of numerical and symbolic inference techniques in clinical decision making 14, 21, 28] . These studies strongly suggested, contrary to the assumption prevalent at the time, that numerical methods were not the only sound and practical means of making decisions under uncertainty.
The rst line of work was in an empirical tradition, concerned with how people make decisions and the strengths and weaknesses of the decision making process. One study investigated diagnostic decision making by medical students and compared two computational models of decision making on a simulated medical diagnosis problem 13] . The models were implemented as sets of production rules, one implementing a statistical model and one a knowledge-based, semiqualitative model. The results strongly suggested that the latter model gave a better account of human reasoning under uncertainty. This is consistent with a well established nding from psychological research that people do not manage uncertainty in ways which closely resemble normative probabilistic reasoning.
Classical decision theorists have strongly criticised human judgement precisely on the grounds that people do not comply with the requirements of probability theory. In contrast some cognitive scientists have questioned the force of this observation by emphasising the exibility and other virtues of human reasoning (e.g. 37]). This observation was reinforced by a study which investigated the performance of an expert system based on a model of human reasoning 14]. In a realistic diagnostic problem in gastroenterology it was found that the diagnostic accuracy of the expert system was very similar to that of a Bayesian diagnostic system though the expert system achieved this level of performance using only half the information provided to the probabilistic system. A recent paper has revisited this issue 5].
Other empirical studies suggest that, notwithstanding the quantitative precision of probabilistic evidence analysis, much practical medical decision making can be successfully carried out without precise numerical data. For example 21], a rule-based system for leukaemia diagnosis was developed using the EMYCIN expert system shell. The accuracy of the system, as compared with the decisions of a domain expert, was 64%. When the CFs were limited to just two values, 1.0 or 0.5 (loosely \certain" or \uncertain") a 5% increase in correct diagnoses was observed! In another study, decision making using a semiqualitative decision procedure was compared with a probabilistic procedure using data regarding the admission of 140 patients to a coronary care unit. It was found that the symbolic decision model performed at least as well as the probabilistic model as determined by an ROC analysis 28]. Other independent studies have con rmed the nding that practical decision making can be carried out successfully without depending upon precise quantitative data (e.g. 4, 35] ).
A model for reasoning under uncertainty
Having established these results, the motivation for further work was an interest in building decision support systems which would have a number of advantages over conventionally available technologies:
{ They would not depend upon the availability of objective statistical data (which are frequently not available in complex domains like medicine) { They could make use of other kinds of reasoning than statistical inference (e.g. causal, functional and temporal reasoning) which might be more intuitive than quantitative reasoning. { They could support all phases of decision making, not just evidence analysis, such as recognising when a decision is needed, what the decision options are, what information is relevant to the choice and so forth. An initial framework for \symbolic decision theory", using rst-order logic for much of the deductive reasoning required and argumentation for the management of uncertainty, was proposed 15, 18] , and early evidence for the practicality of the theory came from its use in the Oxford System of Medicine (OSM) 17], a decision support system aimed at general practitioners which provides a generic decision procedure for a range of medical decision tasks. Further evidence for the usefulness of the theory comes from the wide range of possible applications that have now been developed 11] and in particular the program CAPSULE. This latter is a system which gives support to general practitioners in prescribing drugs and which has been shown to be of signi cant value in this role 39].
In addition, however, it was agreed, in accordance with the view generally held by decision theorists, that any decision procedure which is to be used for practical applications, particularly those like medical applications which have safety implications, must be given a sound theoretical underpinning. While the symbolic approach might be \inspired" by observations of human exibility, people make mistakes and it is clearly not desirable to emulate those mistakes! 3 Formalising the model
The most contentious element of symbolic decision theory is the use of argumentation as the basic framework for reasoning under uncertainty. The central idea in argumentation about beliefs (which is the area of argumentation which has been formalised so far) is that an argument is a tentative proof of a proposition; thus an argument is a proof which can fail if suitably strong arguments against the proposition can be found. The fact that a proposition can have arguments for and against it suggests a divergence between argumentation and classical rst order logic in which propositions are true or false. Furthermore, as pointed out in 2], argumentation has many commonalities with intuitionistic logic, suggesting that argumentation might be given a sound basis in category theory since this is possible for intuitionistic logic. The rst steps in providing this basis are detailed in 2] which identi es the structure of the space of arguments, along with the kind of operations possible over them. The rest of the formalisation is provided in 1], which also highlights the link between argumentation and Dempster-Shafer theory 36].
With this semantics in mind, it is possible to de ne a logic LA in which the consequences of a database are a set of arguments, and this is the subject of 3] and 25]. In this work logical formulae are augmented with their proofs and when formulae are combined, the proofs are handled in an appropriate manner. This means that it is possible to determine the validity of formulae derived in the logic based upon the strength of the arguments for and against individual formulae, and that the way in which this is done is in accordance with the categorytheoretic semantics. This process has been automated in the Argumentation Theorem Prover 26], and a summary of the formal model is recorded in 24].
Alternative semantics
The proof theoretic semantics given in 3] and 25] are not the only possible semantics for argumentation. Indeed, two further interpretations have been provided. The rst 7] is an extension of the standard Kripke semantics for modal logic which gives a possible worlds interpretation for what it means for an argument to support a proposition to some degree. The second 31, 32] relates certain types of argumentation to probability theory by taking an argument in favour of a proposition to mean that there is evidence that the probability of the proposition increases (so the proposition becomes more likely to be true). Thus argumentation can capture probabilistic reasoning if required, and so it is possible to claim that, under particular conditions, argumentation is a normative theory for handling uncertainty.
The probabilistic semantics have two further advantages. The rst is that, because they tie the notion of an argument securely to well-understood ideas about qualitative probability, it is possible to harness a number of useful results concerning qualitative probability. In particular, it is possible to develop a nergrained representation of what it means to have an argument for a proposition which allows arguments of di erent strengths to be accommodated 30, 32, 33] . The second additional advantage of the probabilistic semantics is that it suggests that decision making based upon argumentation can also be understood in terms of the classical decision making paradigm. Thus it o ers ways of formalising the concept of arguments about actions and values in addition to the existing formalisation of arguments about beliefs. This last point is explored in 23].
A general model of reasoning
In addition to the arguments for argumentation as a symbolic model of decision making, we can argue 20] that it is a model of \practical reasoning" of the kind that humans indulge in every day. It captures many of the modes of commonsense reasoning| nding support for ideas, attacking other ideas, and trying to attack the support of other ideas. It handles contradictions, and should also enable the resolution of con icting arguments at the meta-level. Furthermore, there is a strong case that argumentation provides a general framework for unifying many methods for reasoning under uncertainty, such as possibility and probability 34] theories. In this role argumentation is less a formalisation of human reasoning than a tool that can enable the use of other formalisms. Argumentation provides a general way of combining logical reasoning with Bayesian probability by using it to construct a network of in uences between relevant variables. Indeed, argumentation is su ciently general as to underlie symbolic as well as quantitative formalisms 27].
However, it is possible to do more with argumentation than just provide a framework for using established formalisms, instead, as is discussed in 9], it is possible to handle inconsistent information|a problem beyond the scope of many established approaches to handling uncertainty. That is, it is possible to have certain arguments for both a proposition p and its negation :p. This inconsistency enables LA to provide a ranking over the propositions for which arguments may be proposed. In particular, arguments for propositions are allocated di erent classes of acceptability 8, 10], the allocation depending on factors such as whether an argument is based on a consistent database or whether there are any counter-arguments. This approach can be used to give a purely logical approach to uncertainty that ranks propositions only on the structure of the arguments for them, and it can be augmented by the use of preference relations over subsets of the database.
Argumentation and autonomous agents
The exibility and generality of argumentation has led to it being used at the heart of a model of autonomous agency 6, 16], a model which extends the classical decision making paradigm to include reasoning about which plans to adopt as well as what to believe. This, in turn, has resulted in an interest in handling medical treatment protocols and the development of the tool PROforma 19] for building decision support systems to help in following such protocols.
In all of the variants of argumentation that have been discussed so far, the argumentation mechanism has been used within a single agent. This agent, then, argues internally about which course of action is the best way of resolving its predicament. However, argumentation is also possible in scenarios involving a number of agents|indeed it is quite natural to think of an argument as involving two or more participants. Applying argumentation in a multi-agent scenario gives the agents involved a mechanism for resolving their di erences and reaching suitable compromises, and this is especially important where the agents are completely autonomous and so have no particular reason to work together. The use of argumentation for negotiation is explored in 29], and a minimal framework to support such argumentation is de ned in 38].
Summary
To summarise, empirical evidence for the usefulness of a symbolic theory of decision making has led to the development of a formal model based on rstorder logic combined with the use of argumentation for handling uncertainty. The versatility of the model is suggested by its wide practical applicability, while the justi cation for the use of argumentation is based upon its proven practical exibility and its well-developed formal semantics. The model now forms the basis of a general technology for decision support systems.
